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Abstract A basic puzzle about presuppositions concerns their projection from
propositional constructions. This problem has regained much attention in the last
decade since many of its prominent accounts, including variants of the trivalent
Strong Kleene connectives, suffer from the so-called proviso problem. This pa-
per argues that basic insights of the Strong Kleene system can be used without
invoking the proviso problem. It is shown that the notion of determinant value
that underlies the definition of the Strong Kleene connectives leads to a natural
generalization of the filtering conditions proposed in Karttunen’s article “Presuppo-
sitions of compound sentences” (LI, 1973). Incorporating this generalized condition
into an incremental projection algorithm avoids the proviso problem as well as the
derivation of conditional presuppositions. It is argued that the same effects that were
previously modelled using conditional presuppositions may be viewed as effects of
presupposition suspension and contextual inference on presupposition projection.
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1 Introduction
It is now almost fifty years since Karttunen (1973) observed that different proposi-
tional operators show different regularities with presupposition projection. Karttunen
focused on examples like the following:
(1) a. Jack has children (#no children) and all of Jack’s children are bald.
b. Jack has no children (#children) or (else) all of Jack’s children are bald.
In these sentences, the second conjunct (“all of Jack’s children are bald”) presupposes
that Jack has children. In conjunctions like (1a), this presupposition disappears
* A technical version of central ideas in this paper appeared in (Winter 2019). The analysis of
conditional presuppositions is new with the present version. For their comments, I am grateful
to three MOL reviewers, as well as to Lisa Bylinina, Donka Farkas, Danny Fox, Itamar Francez,
Philippe de Groote, James Hampton, Lauri Karttunen, Ed Keenan, Heidi Klockmann, Matthew
Mandelkern, Rick Nouwen, Jacopo Romoli, Philippe Schlenker, members of the presupposition
reading group in Utrecht, and the SALT 29 audience. Work on this paper was partially funded by
the European Research Council (ERC) under the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and
innovation programme (grant agreement No 742204).
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when the first conjunct asserts it. By contrast, in disjunctions like (1b), the same
presupposition disappears when the first conjunct negates it. Contrasts similar to
(1a-b) have led semanticists to hypothesize that the way in which presuppositions
are “projected” or “filtered” should be predictable from the core meanings of the
propositional connectives. At the same time, Karttunen’s findings exposed a general
problem for standard treatments of propositional operators in trivalent semantics.
Whether presuppositions are filtered or projected in propositional constructions
depends on semantic and pragmatic relations between the operands, and not only on
their truth-values in specific models. This point challenges purely truth-conditional
accounts of presupposition in trivalent semantics (van Fraassen 1971). A similar
problem was pointed out in later years (Geurts 1996) for dynamic frameworks
involving context changing operators (Stalnaker 1973; Karttunen 1974; Heim 1983),
and was branded as the proviso problem. Recent works continue to address this
problem (van Rooij 2007; Singh 2007; Schlenker 2011; Lassiter 2012; Mayr &
Romoli 2016; Mandelkern 2016; Mandelkern & Rothschild 2018; Francez 2019).
Taking a step back from dynamic accounts, and in the face of the proviso
problem, this paper reconsiders the trivalent treatment of presuppositions as a truth-
conditional phenomenon. As it turns out, this treatment allows us to formally
regain a unified outlook on different propositional operators using one general
filtering condition. This condition takes into account Karttunen’s misgivings about
truth-functional accounts of presupposition projection, while synthesizing them
with more recent ideas about incremental processing (Schlenker 2008, 2009; Fox
2008). This approach readopts a key insight of Strong Kleene operators: values that
determine the result of a bivalent operator also determine the result of its trivalent
version. It is shown that this approach can completely avoid the proviso problem
when implemented as a global condition on filtering following Karttunen’s original
observations. A question that this proposal leaves open concerns the status of so-
called “conditional presuppositions” (Beaver 2001). These are cases where the
presupposition of a propositional construction is weaker than the presupposition
of the triggering operand, but the latter does not seem to be completely filtered.
I will argue that the proposed filtering condition allows us to accommodate such
effects without running into the proviso problem. A key observation of Karttunen’s
work is that conditional presuppositions can be explained as resulting from the
sensitivity of filtering to contextual inferences. We treat these contextual inferences
by quantifying over intended models as part of the general filtering condition. This,
together with the well-known observation (Gazdar 1979; Soames 1982; Abbott 2006)
about the possibility of presuppositions to be “suspended” under pragmatic pressure,
is claimed to give a non-presuppositional account of conditional inferences. Since
proviso problems result from techniques that modify presuppositions into conditional
presuppositions, it is concluded that such techniques may be empirically unnecessary
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and that full filtering/projection of presuppositions may be sufficient. At the same
time, it is suggested that a major open challenge for trivalent semantics lies in the
need to selectively filter presuppositions of certain triggers in an expression, while
fully projecting presuppositions of other triggers in the same expression.
Section 2 reviews trivalent approaches to presupposition projection, with the
Strong Kleene truth tables as a dominant tool, leading to the Schlenker/Fox formula-
tion of incremental truth-valuation. This proposal, despite its attractiveness, faces the
proviso problem in some elementary cases. Section 3 develops incremental trivalent
semantics in a way that addresses the proviso problem, with close attention to one
intuition that underlies the Strong Kleene treatment: a presupposition of an operand
is filtered if the value of a preceding operand independently determines the result of
the propositional operation. Applying this condition globally, i.e. in all contextually
salient situations, gives rise to a filtering condition that regulates the incremental
semantic algorithm. This condition generalizes Karttunen’s filtering conditions on
specific connectives, thus avoiding the proviso problem. Section 4 addresses some
central problems surrounding conditional presuppositions, context-sensitive filtering,
and suspension. Conclusions are given in section 5.
2 Setting the stage
A presupposition of a sentence S is pragmatically defined as a meaning component
of S that is taken for granted as common ground in all felicitous usages (von Fintel
2004). Thus, when a sentence S1 has another sentence S2 as one of its presupposi-
tions, any participant who accepts S1 as felicitous and true must accept S2 as true as
well. In this sense, presuppositions are like other entailments. For example, from
sentence (2) below we infer the presupposition (3a) as much as we infer (3b).
(2) Sue’s partner likes fishing.
(3) a.  Sue has a partner.
b. ⇒ Someone likes fishing.
Presuppositions are semantically distinguished from other entailments in the way
they are inferred, or “projected”, from complex sentences.1 Specifically, when a
sentence is negated, its presuppositions may follow although its assertive content
1 Another distinction is also commonly suggested: falsifying (part of) a sentence’s assertion makes the
sentence false, whereas falsifying a presupposition of the sentence makes it exhibit a truth-value gap.
von Fintel (2004) convincingly argues against using this common wisdom as an empirical criterion,
mentioning that “the consensus view of presupposition experts” is that “people’s intuitions about
truth-value gaps [are] too unreliable to merit scientific attention” hence “argumentation cannot [...]
proceed by simply polling naive speakers about whether sentences are false or neither true nor false”.
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does not. For instance, from sentence (4) below we can infer (3a), but there is no
way we can infer (3b).2
(4) Sue’s partner doesn’t like fishing.
From these standard considerations we derive the trivalent approach to presup-
positions. In this approach, a sentence S1 is said to presuppose a sentence S2 if
whenever S1 is interpreted as true or false, S2 is interpreted as true. Thus, S2 is
entailed by both S1 and its negation. When the presupposition S2 is not true, it is
assumed that S1 suffers a truth-value gap. Alternatively, falsity of S2 may also be
seen as resulting in S1 having a third, “gappy” truth-value, which we here denote
‘∗’. Thus, trivalent semantics respects the common intuition that any presupposition
failure leads to a truth-value gap (note 1). Summarizing these ideas, we arrive at the
following definitions (van Fraassen 1971: 154-5; Keenan 1973; Beaver 1997):
(5) Trivalent interpretation: Sentences denote propositions that are interpreted
as 1 (true), 0 (false) or ∗ (failure) in any given model.
(6) Presupposition: We say that a proposition ϕ presupposes a proposition ψ ,
and denote ϕ  ψ , if for every model M: if [[ϕ]]M 6=∗ then [[ψ]]M=1.
This notion of presupposition is a special case of standard Tarskian entailment
(Nerlich 1965,Beaver 1997), defined by:
(7) Tarskian entailment: We say that a proposition ϕ entails a proposition ψ ,
and denote ϕ ⇒ ψ , if for every model M: if [[ϕ]]M=1 then [[ψ]]M=1.
Entailments that are not qualified as presuppositions are referred to as assertions.
Accordingly, we say that sentence (2) asserts (2b), or alternatively, that (2b) is part
of (2)’s assertive content.
Presuppositions are semantically distinguished from assertions in that they may
be inferred when triggered under negation (4). Similar “projections” of presup-
positions are also manifest from antecedents of conditionals and under possibility
modals, as in the following examples (Karttunen 1973):
(8) a. If Sue brings her partner it will make Dan envious.
b. Possibly, Sue will bring her partner.
2 Projected presuppositions may be defeasible, unlike the simple presuppositions that they originate
from (Abbott 2006). For example, while the presupposition (2) (3a) is an indefeasible inference,
the inference (4) (3a) may be “suspended” or “canceled” under pragmatic pressures. We will get
back to this point in section 4, where it becomes theoretically crucial.
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From both (8a) and (8b) it is easy to infer that Sue has a partner. More generally,
presuppositions are freely projected from environments that are non-veridical for
other entailments.3
More complex projection patterns are observed with binary propositional con-
structions: conjunction, disjunction and conditionals. Let us first consider presuppo-
sition projection from conditional sentences, starting with the following example:
(9) If Sue is in a good mood, she will bring her partner to the party.
Sentence (9) entails that Sue is in a relationship. Accordingly, we say that the
presupposition of the consequent in (9) is projected out of the conditional.4 In this
case there is no semantic relation between the antecedent of the conditional (“Sue is
in a good mood”) and the presupposition (“Sue has a partner”) of the consequent.
By contrast, let us consider the following example:
(10) If Sue is in a relationship, she will bring her partner to the party.
Unlike (9), the conditional in (10) does not presuppose that Sue has a partner.
Thus, we say that the presupposition of the consequent in (10) is filtered. This
filtering is assumed to be connected to the fact that the antecedent of (10) asserts the
presupposition of the consequent: being in a relationship means having a partner. A
similar case of filtering is observed in examples like the following:
(11) If Sue is married, she will bring her partner to the party.
Similarly to (10), sentence (11) is consistent with situations in which Sue has no
partner. Thus, the presupposition of the consequent is again filtered. As in (10),
the antecedent of (11) entails the presupposition of the consequent, but in (11) the
entailment is asymmetric, as having a partner does not entail being married.
To account for projection facts as in (10,11), trivalent accounts often employ the
Strong Kleene (SK) connectives in Table 1 (Beaver 1997; Beaver & Krahmer 2001).
When interpreting the value ‘∗’ as “unknown”, we can view these trivalent SK
operators as derived from basic properties of the corresponding bivalent operators.
Let us illustrate this using the material implication ϕ → ψ . When ϕ has the value 0,
the result of bivalent implication is 1 independently of the value of ψ . This property
3 A n-ary propositional operator op is called veridical in its i-th argument if it satisfies the entailment
op(ϕ1, . . . ,ϕi, . . . ,ϕn)⇒ ϕi (Valencia, Van der Wouden & Zwarts 1993; de Marneffe, Manning
& Potts 2012). Bivalent conjunction is veridical (in both arguments), whereas bivalent negation,
implication and disjunction, as well as possibility modals are not veridical (in any argument).
4 When saying that a proposition ψ is “the” presupposition of ϕ we mean that ψ is the maximal
bivalent proposition that ϕ presupposes. For instance, the maximal bivalent presupposition of the
proposition for Sue’s partner stopped smoking is the bivalent statement Sue has a partner, x, and
x used to smoke. Formally: a proposition ψ is the maximal bivalent presupposition (in short: “the
presupposition”) of ϕ if for every model M: [[ϕ]]M 6=∗ iff [[ψ]]M=1, and [[ϕ]]M=∗ iff [[ψ]]M=0.
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∧ 0 1 ∗
0 0 0 0
1 0 1 ∗
∗ 0 ∗ ∗
∨ 0 1 ∗
0 0 1 ∗
1 1 1 1
∗ ∗ 1 ∗
→ 0 1 ∗
0 1 1 1
1 0 1 ∗
∗ ∗ 1 ∗
Table 1 Strong Kleene (SK) connectives: the rows/columns pertain to the
value of the lefthand/righthand operand, respectively
is preserved in the definition of the trivalent operator. Thus, when ϕ is 0, the trivalent
implication ϕ→ψ is defined as 1 even when the value of ψ is ‘∗’. Intuitively, this is
justified because in the bivalent semantics of implication, when ϕ is 0 it is possible
to infer the result also when the value of ψ is unknown, for the value ϕ → ψ is
bound to be 1 anyway. By contrast, when ϕ is 1, we cannot determine the value of
the bivalent implication ϕ → ψ without knowing the value of ψ . Accordingly, if ϕ
is 1 and ψ is ‘∗’, the result of SK implication is ‘∗’ as well. A similar idea underlies
the definitions of SK conjunction and disjunction.
In general, for all binary propositional operators op, the SK truth-tables rely on
the following definition:
(12) Value determination: A value ν of an operand determines the result of a
binary operation op as µ , if whenever ν is assigned to that operand, the result
of the operation is µ independently of the value of the other operand.
When a value ν in the first operand determines the result of an operation as µ , we
say that ν left-determines the result as µ . Similarly, when ν in the second operand
determines the result as µ , we say that ν right-determines the result as µ . Thus, for
the three bivalent propositional connectives we have:
• Conjunction is left-determined and right-determined by 0 as 0.
• Disjunction is left-determined and right-determined by 1 as 1.
• Implication is left-determined by 0 and right-determined by 1, in both cases as 1.
These value-determination properties are the key for defining the SK truth-tables.
Peters (1979) proposed an asymmetric version of the SK connectives, which
is more closely related to the behavior of presuppositions with the propositional
connectives in English. More recently, the reasoning that underlies the Strong
Kleene/Peters tables has been used in incremental theories of projection (Schlenker
2008, 2009; Fox 2008; Mandelkern & Romoli 2017, see also Mandelkern, Zehr,
Romoli & Schwarz 2019). One central idea of these theories is summarized by
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op: bivalent binary propositional operator
S1,S2: sentences with trivalent denotations [[S1]], [[S2]]
result: trivalent denotation [[S1 op S2]]
i. Evaluate the truth-value [[S1]].
ii. If [[S1]]=∗ then result = ∗, else:
iii. If [[S1]] left-determines op as µ , then result = µ , else:
a. Evaluate the truth-value [[S2]].
b. If [[S2]]=∗ then result = ∗, else:
c. result = [[S1]] op [[S2]].
Algorithm 1: SK-based algorithm for presupposition projection
Algorithm 1. For any two sentences S1 and S2 and a binary connective op, Algorithm
1 evaluates the trivalent denotation of S1 opS2 using the trivalent (recursively given)
denotations of S1 and S2 and the bivalent definition of op.
To illustrate the way this incremental processing works, let us consider the
following example, a variation of sentence (11):
(13) If the queen of Queensland is in a relationship, she will bring her partner to
the party.
Intuitively, sentence (13) presupposes that there is a (unique) queen of Queensland,
but not that she has a partner. Considering the way that Algorithm 1 behaves on the
three possible truth-values of the antecedent, we observe the following cases:
A. The antecedent is true – there is a (unique) queen of Queensland and she is in a
relationship. The truth of the antecedent does not allow us to determine the result
of the bivalent implication, hence the consequent is evaluated in step (iii-a). The
presuppositions of the consequent are satisfied: there is a Queenslandian queen,
and she has a partner. Accordingly, a bivalent result is derived in step (iii-c),
hence the conditional does not suffer a presupposition failure.
B. The antecedent is false – there is a (unique) queen of Queensland but she is not
in a relationship. In this case the antecedent determines the bivalent implication
as true. Thus, step (iii) defines the result of the conditional to be true without
evaluating the consequent.
C. The antecedent fails – there is no (unique) queen of Queensland. In this case
step (ii) defines the result to be a failure without evaluating the consequent.
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The only case where the truth-value of the consequent is considered is case A,
where the presupposition that the queen has a partner is satisfied. This means that
Algorithm 1 ignores presupposition failures of the consequent that ensue when the
queen is not in a relationship. By contrast, the presupposition about the existence of a
Queenslandian queen is projected, since case C makes failures of the antecedent lead
to a failure of the conditional. This result is in line with the linguistic judgements.
When the processing of binary operations is assumed to go from left to right,
Algorithm 1 gives Peters’ asymmetric version of the SK tables. However, it is
important to note that Algorithm 1 itself does not make any assumption about
left-to-right processing. This becomes critical when considering antecedent-final
conditionals like the following syntactic variation on (10):
(14) Sue will bring her partner to the party, if she is in a relationship.
Antecedent-final conditionals like (14) support filtering of the consequent’s presup-
position similar to the antecedent-initial conditional (10) (Mandelkern & Romoli
2017 and references therein). Algorithm 1 does not specify which of the two sen-
tences in a binary construction is the sentence S1 that is processed first. This is
something that a more general theory of semantic processing should specify. How-
ever, we may assume, as Mandelkern and Romoli do, that in both antecedent-initial
conditionals (10) and antecedent-final conditionals (14), it is the antecedent that is
processed first. This assumption accounts for the similar filtering behavior in (10)
and (14). With respect to conjunctions and disjunctions, our analysis below will
adopt usual assumptions about left-to-right semantic processing.
Algorithm 1 is an insightful account of presupposition filtering. It relies on the
well-understood bivalent semantics of the propositional operators and on minimalist
assumptions about semantic processing. At the same time, it suffers from a problem
that has challenged theories of presupposition since the 1970s. To illustrate, let us
reconsider sentence (9), restated below:
(15) If Sue is in a good mood, she will bring her partner to the party.
Hearing (15), we infer that Sue has a partner, but Algorithm 1 only expects a weaker
inference. The algorithm only projects the presupposition of the consequent in (15)
if the antecedent is true. However, if Sue is not in a good mood, the truth-value
of the consequent sentence is not evaluated and the conditional is expected not to
presuppose anything. This kind of problem for SK-based accounts of presupposition
was recognized in Karttunen (1973). The same problem was also observed for
later accounts (Karttunen 1974; Heim 1983) and reintroduced under the label of the
proviso problem (Geurts 1996).
When it comes to conjunctions and disjunctions, Algorithm 1 shows similar
advantages and disadvantages to those we have discussed in relation to conditionals.
As for disjunctions, let us consider the following examples:
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(16) Either Sue is not in a relationship or (else) she will surely bring her partner
to the party.
(17) Either Sue is unmarried, or (else) she will surely bring her partner to the
party.
(18) Either Sue will stay at home tonight or (else) she will surely bring her partner
to the party.
From sentence (16) we cannot infer anything about Sue’s relationship: she may
either have a partner or she may not. Sentence (17) is also indecisive on whether
Sue has a partner: the sentence is consistent with situations where Sue is not in
a relationship (hence unmarried) or where she has a partner (be it her spouse or
not). It is natural to assume that in sentences (16) and (17), the presupposition that
Sue has a partner is filtered because the assertion in the first conjunct supports an
alternative scenario that can make the disjunction true without requiring that Sue is
in a relationship (the first conjunct in (16) even requires that she is not). Algorithm 1
respects this intuition: in (16) and (17), the second conjunct is evaluated only when
the first conjunct is false, i.e. in case Sue has a partner (16) (or furthermore a spouse,
in the case of (17)). What Algorithm 1 does not expect is the complete absence of
filtering in (18). If Sue stays at home, the algorithm does not expect sentence (18)
to convey that she is in a relationship, which it univocally does. When it comes to
disjunction, this is another instance of the proviso problem for Algorithm 1.
Moving on to conjunctions, let us consider the following example:
(19) Sue is in a relationship and will bring her partner to the party.
Intuitively, we may expect that since sentence (19) explicitly asserts that Sue is in a
relationship, it cannot presuppose that. This expectation is supported by examples
like the following:
(20) a. If Sue is in a relationship and brings her partner, it will surely make Dan
envious.
b. Possibly, Sue is in a relationship and will bring her partner
In both (20a) and (20b), it is impossible to infer that Sue has a partner. This helps to
classify the claim in (19) that Sue has a partner as part of the assertive content of this
sentence rather than a presupposition. Accordingly, (19) is classified as yet another
case of presupposition filtering. A similar case of filtering can be demonstrated in
the following example, where the first conjunct asymmetrically entails that Sue has
a partner:
(21) Sue is married and will bring her partner.
Algorithm 1 accounts for filtering in (19) and (21) similarly to what we saw with
conditionals and disjunctions. Whenever the first conjunct in (19)/(21) is false, the
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second conjunct is ignored; and when the first conjunct is true, the presupposition of
the second conjunct is satisfied. Once more, Algorithm 1 is less successful when
there is no semantic relation between the conjuncts:
(22) Sue will arrive and bring her partner.
Sentence (22) univocally presupposes that Sue has a partner. Algorithm 1 fails
to predict that. Counter-intuitively, the algorithm only expects sentence (22) to
presuppose that Sue has a partner if she arrives. This is again the proviso problem
for Algorithm 1.
3 The filtering condition
The examples that were reviewed in section 2 involve conditionals, disjunctions and
conjunctions. The regularities of the projection/filtering that are observed in these
elementary cases are described in (Karttunen 1973: (13,17,24)) as follows:
(F1) In conditionals if S1 then S2 and conjunctions S1 and S2, a presupposition of
S2 is filtered if and only if S1 entails that presupposition.
(F2) In disjunctions S1 or S2, a presupposition of S2 is filtered if and only if the
negation of S1 entails that presupposition.
These rules are illustrated above with the presupposition trigger Sue’s partner.
Similar regularities have also been demonstrated with other presupposition triggers:
definite descriptions, factives (know/happy/regret that...), aspectual verbs (start,
stop), additive adverbs (too, again) and clefts (it is NP who...).
When considered on the background of the Strong Kleene connectives, Kart-
tunen’s conditions point toward a generalization that does not invoke the proviso
problem. To see that, let us first reconsider the relevant examples with conditionals:
(23) a. If Sue is in a relationship (is married), she will bring her partner to the
party. (=10,11)
6 Sue has a partner – filtering of presupposition from second operand
b. If Sue is in a good mood, she will bring her partner to the party. (=15)
 Sue has a partner – no filtering of presupposition from second operand
In sentence (23a) the antecedent entails the presupposition of the consequent. In
(23b) there is no logical relation between the antecedent and that presupposition.
Karttunen’s condition (F1) relates this logical difference between (23a) and (23b)
to the contrast in presupposition projection. This intuitive connection begs the
question why filtering in conditionals should work this way. As we saw, previous
methods that are inspired by the Strong Kleene semantics only give a partial answer
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to this question. Such accounts elegantly treat filtering in (23a) as a matter of the
trivalent SK semantics of implication (Table 1) or incremental semantic processing
(Algorithm 1). However, in (23b), previous SK-inspired methods fail to predict full
projection of the antecedent’s presupposition. This is an instance of the proviso
problem that challenges SK-based treatments of conditionals.5
But is the proviso problem a fundamental challenge for the general principles
of the SK system? One reason to doubt it arises once we observe that the proviso
problem is tied with a localist view, which treats projection as a truth-functional
phenomenon. Semantic accounts that lead to the proviso problem typically assume
that in cases like (23), it is sufficient to evaluate the antecedent in a given situation in
order to correctly handle presupposition projection from the consequent. By contrast,
Karttunen’s descriptive condition (F1) relies on entailments between propositions,
which can only be assessed globally by looking at a large class of relevant situations.
Although conditions (F1) and (F2) may look ad hoc, we will now see that they can
be reformulated as stemming from a globalist use of the SK-based notion of value
determination. This leads to a more general filtering condition that does not suffer
from the proviso problem.
To illustrate the idea, let us consider Karttunen’s analysis of sentence (23a). In
this case, the entailment from the antecedent to the presupposition of the consequent
means that whenever the consequent fails the antecedent is false. Thus, here we have
a consequent whose presupposition only fails in situations where the antecedent
alone determines the result of the implication. According to the SK reasoning, the
presupposition of the consequent in (23a) can be globally ignored, since the result of
the implication can always be inferred when that presupposition fails. This accounts
for the filtering in (23a). By contrast, in sentence (23b), the consequent may suffer a
presupposition failure while the antecedent is true. This happens in cases where Sue
is in a good mood but does not have a partner. In such cases, even Strong Kleene
cannot “save” the result from failing. This means that the presupposition of the
consequent in (23b) cannot always be ignored, as there are cases of presupposition
failures in the consequent that can not be saved. In such cases, where there is no
global way to filter a presupposition, Karttunen’s description dictates that it must be
globally projected.
To develop this reasoning further, we first formulate trivalent versions of Kart-
tunen’s conditions (F1) and (F2). Condition (F1) sanctions filtering in conditionals
and conjunctions where the sentential operand S1 entails the maximal presupposition
of S2.6 This means that in every model M where [[S1]]
M is 1, there is a bivalent
5 Methods relying on context changing operators (Stalnaker 1973; Karttunen 1974; Heim 1983) suffer
from a similar problem.
6 For the sake of presentation here I assume that conditions (F1) and (F2) only regulate filtering of the
maximal presupposition of S1. In (Karttunen 1973) it is not completely clear whether these conditions
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truth-value to S2, i.e. [[S2]]
M 6=∗. Equivalently, when [[S2]]M=∗ we have [[S1]]M=0
or [[S1]]
M=∗. Thus, we reformulate (F1) as follows:
(F1’) In conditionals if S1 then S2 and conjunctions S1 and S2, the presupposition





Condition (F1’) sanctions filtering only if S2’s failure entails that S1 is a falsity
or a failure. Cases where S1 is false allow us to determine the result of the im-
plication/conjunction despite S2’s failure. Cases where both S2 and S1 fail may
be considered “lost cases” for filtering: no non-arbitrary method can salvage the
result from failing when both operands fail. Condition (F1’) allows filtering of S2’s
presupposition only if its failure is guaranteed to determine the result, ignoring such
“lost cases”.
Moving on to disjunctions, we can now state more directly how their projec-
tion/filtering behavior differs from that of implications and conjunctions. We restate
Karttunen’s condition (F2) as follows:
(F2’) In disjunctions S1 or S2, the presupposition of S2 is filtered if and only if
in every model M where [[S2]]
M=∗ we have [[S1]]M=1 or [[S1]]M=∗.
The underlined clause in (F2’) highlights its difference from (F1’). Keeping in mind
that with disjunction it is truth of the first operand that determines the result rather
than falsity, we are led to the following more general filtering condition:7
(24) Filtering Condition (first version): A proposition ϕ op ψ satisfies the filter-
ing condition if every situation failing ψ leads to a value of ϕ that is either ∗
or determines the bivalent result of ϕ op ψ .
The filtering condition in (24) is a trivalent generalization of Karttunen’s (1973)
specific observations. Let us now introduce this condition into Algorithm 1. In the
revised Algorithm 2, we no longer “blindly” compute a bivalent result whenever
the truth-value of the first sentence S1 allows us to determine that result. Rather,
Algorithm 2 only computes results in this way when the filtering condition holds
(clause (iii)). Thus, in sentences (23a,19/21,16/17), where the filtering condition
(24) holds, Algorithm 2 filters the presupposition in the second operand similarly to
Algorithm 1. However, if the filtering condition does not hold, then any failure of the
second sentence S2 leads clauses (iii-a) and (iii-b) of Algorithm 2 to fail the result.
are also supposed to regulate filtering of non-maximal presuppositions (e.g. the presupposition Dan
has a sibling of the sentence Dan’s sister left). This point is important for the analysis of partial and
selective filtering, discussed in section 4.
7 A generalization along these lines seems to be implied by the remarks in Karttunen (1973: 181-2).
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op: bivalent binary propositional operator
S1,S2: sentences with trivalent denotations [[S1]], [[S2]]
result: trivalent denotation [[S1 op S2]]
i. Evaluate the truth-value [[S1]].
ii. If [[S1]]=∗ then result = ∗, else:
iii. If the filtering condition holds of S1 and S2, and
[[S1]] left-determines op as µ , then result= µ , else:
a. Evaluate the truth-value [[S2]].
b. If [[S2]]=∗ then result = ∗, else:
c. result = [[S1]] op [[S2]].
Algorithm 2: SK-based algorithm for presupposition projection, including a filter-
ing condition
For instance, as we saw, in sentence (23b) the filtering condition (24) does not hold.
Accordingly, clause (iii) of Algorithm 2 evaluates S2 independently of the value of
S1. This evaluation leads the algorithm to assign the value ‘∗’ to the conditional
sentence (23b) in all cases where Sue does not have a partner, independently of
her mood. This strategy avoids the proviso problem that Algorithm 1 faces with
sentences like (23b), (18) and (22).
So far, we have only considered the filtering condition in cases where the first
operand does not include presupposition triggers. However, we should also consider
cases of multiple triggers as in (13), which is restated below:8
(25) If the queen of Queensland is in a relationship, she will bring her partner to
the party.
As we saw above, (25) only presupposes that Queensland has a (unique) queen, and
is neutral with respect to whether she has a partner. Thus, the presupposition of the
antecedent is projected, whereas another presupposition that is contributed by the
consequent is filtered. As illustrated in the discussion of (13) above, Algorithm 1
accounts for this fact. This is also the case for Algorithm 2, as the filtering condition
(24) holds for sentence (25). The antecedent of (25) Tarski-entails that there is a
unique queen of Queensland and she has a partner. This is the presupposition of the
consequent. Equivalently: any failure of the consequent either leads to a failure of
the antecedent (when the queen of Queensland fails to refer) or to its falsity (when
8 Examples with multiple triggers that are more problematic for Algorithm 2 are discussed at the end
of section 4.
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the queen of Queensland successfully refers to a person who doesn’t have a partner).
Sentences (26,27) below illustrate similar points on conjunction and disjunction:
(26) The queen of Queensland is in a relationship, and she will bring her partner
to the party.
(27) Either the queen of Queensland is not in a relationship, or she will bring her
partner to the party.
Like (25), sentences (26,27) satisfy the filtering condition in (24). Accordingly,
Algorithm 2 models the filtering and projection correctly in these cases as well.
4 On conditional presuppositions
Karttunen’s (1973) filtering conditions and the generalized condition (24) treat pro-
jection and filtering as a matter of all-or-nothing: either a presupposition is projected
out of a propositional construction or it is filtered. However, since Karttunen &
Peters (1979), it has been repeatedly argued that presupposition filtering is some-
times partial: part of the logical import of a presupposition may be filtered while
the rest is projected. Consider for instance the following example by Mandelkern &
Rothschild (2018):
(28) If Buganda is a monarchy, then Buganda’s king will be at the meeting.
The antecedent of sentence (28) does not logically entail the presupposition of the
consequent: a monarchy may obviously have a queen and not a king. Therefore,
condition (24) expects (28) to fully project the presupposition that Buganda has a
king. This prediction is problematic: if (28) presupposed that, it would entail that
Buganda is a monarchy. That would make the conditional in (28) quite odd, as
it would make the antecedent trivially true, hence logically redundant. However,
in normal contexts, (28) shows no trace of the rhetorical effect that we find in
conditionals whose antecedent is implied to be true (“if I am not a complete idiot...”).
To address this problem, many theories treat cases similar to (28) using the
assumption that such sentences invoke conditional presuppositions. For instance,
Algorithm 1 treats sentence (28) as presupposing (29) below:9
(29) If Buganda is a monarchy, then it has a king.
Intuitively, sentence (29) seems a more likely candidate for being a presupposition
of (28) than the statement Buganda has a king that is projected by Algorithm
2. However, in order to evaluate better the significance of this point we need to
9 Conditional presuppositions are usually analyzed using material implication. Thus, (28) is assumed to
presuppose that Buganda either is a non-monarchy or has a king. For simplicity, I here and henceforth
paraphrase such implicative propositions using conditional sentences.
595
Winter
also consider two other well-known problems. One is the effect of contextual
inferences on filtering, the other is the problem of presupposition suspension, or
“local accommodation”.
4.1 The effects of contextual inferences on filtering
Discussing his filtering conditions, Karttunen (1973) pointed out that salient as-
sumptions of speakers and hearers may boost filtering even in the absence of logical
entailment. To illustrate this fact, let us consider the following contrast from (Beaver
2001: 246,278):
(30) a. If Jane takes a bath, Bill will be annoyed that there is no more hot water.
b. If Jane wants a bath, Bill will be annoyed that there is no more hot water.
In ordinary contexts, sentence (30a) does not presuppose that there is no more hot
water. By contrast, sentence (30b) does presuppose that. Thus, filtering of the
consequent’s presupposition occurs in (30a) but not in (30b). Beaver notes that
sentence (30a) is likely to be uttered if in the relevant household, having a bath may
exhaust available hot water supply. In this likely context for (30a), speakers perceive
a causal relation between situations where Jane takes a bath and situations where
there is no more hot water. By contrast, in (30b) it is unlikely that speakers perceive
any connection between Jane’s wish to take a bath and the lack of hot water. This
contrast is assumed to be the source of the easiness with which filtering occurs in
(30a) vis à vis (30b). Following similar points in (Karttunen 1973: 182-5), Beaver
proposes that filtering in conditionals does not only occur under logical entailment,
but also when speakers and hearers perceive an inference between the antecedent and
the presupposition of the consequent. In sentence (30a), perceiving a causal relation
between the sentences Jane takes a bath and there is no more hot water appears to
be sufficient for licensing filtering despite the absence of logical entailment. The
fact that no parallel causal perception exists in (30b) is held responsible for the lack
of filtering. This shows a limitation of the filtering condition in (24): although it
correctly expects no filtering in (30b), it incorrectly makes the same prediction for
(30a), ignoring the influence of the perceived causal relation.10
Karttunen (1973: 183) proposes to revise his filtering condition into a more
fine-grained condition, which also takes “some (possibly null) set X of assumed
facts” into account. For instance, in ordinary contexts for sentences like (30a) and
(30b), we may assume that taking a bath is likely to exhaust hot water supply,
10 Conditional presuppositions have the opposite merits and demerits. If we assume that the presuppo-
sition of (30a/b) is the conditional if Jane takes/want a bath there is no more hot water, this might
work for (30a) but would invoke the proviso problem for (30b): the latter sentence would incorrectly
be expected to only presuppose that there is no more hot water in cases where Jane wants a bath.
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but merely wanting a bath is not likely to do that. At first sight this reliance on
“assumed facts” may look stipulative. To be sure, it makes the mechanisms of
presupposition projection harder to falsify. However, Karttunen’s idea embodies a
perfectly sensible view on entailment in natural language and how it is influenced by
non-logical knowledge. Once we adopt the Tarskian view in (7), we necessarily rely
on restricting the class of models that is being quantified over. Restrictions on models
that usually get the most attention in formal semantics concern the interpretation
of content words (quantifiers, conjunctions, modals, temporal expressions etc.)
and grammatical constructions (negation, passives, questions etc.). Thus, when
quantifying over models as in definitions (6) and (7) we silently assume that in
some class of intended models, the interpretation of content words and “logical”
grammatical constructions remains constant, in some logically proper sense of
“constancy” (Sher 1991; Keenan 2001). To make this explicit, we must relativize the
filtering condition (24) to a class of models. Stating filtering conditions in relation to
a “set X of assumed facts” amounts to the same view, but also lets the context restrict
the class of intended models. This gives us the more formal version of (24) below:
(31) Filtering Condition (revised version): A proposition ϕ op ψ satisfies the
filtering condition relative to a classM of models if for every model M ∈M :
if [[ψ]]M=∗ then either [[ϕ]]M=∗ or [[ϕ]]M determines the bivalent result of
ϕ op ψ .
Stating the filtering condition in this way means that filtering can only be fully
specified given a class of modelsM . The logical relations in (F1) and (F2), which
we used in our examples for filtering throughout section 3, should be seen as a
limiting case: these relations between propositions hold in any linguistically relevant
class of models. However, the class of models M can also be used to encode
contextually assumed facts, like the inference from the proposition “Jane takes a
bath” to “there is no more hot water”. Let us represent this weak contextual inference
as follows:
(32) bath 99K ¬hot_water
The perceived causality in (32) may be easily invoked by merely uttering the two
sentences “Jane takes a bath” and “there is no more hot water”. This is observed in
the causal interpretation of the conjunction Jane took a bath and there is no more hot
water now. The processes that lead to this perceived causality have little to do with
presupposition projection. Thus, in sentence (30a), we assume that the recognition
of the implication (32) happens prior to applying any projection mechanism. In any
class of models that respects the implication in (32), condition (31) expects filtering
in (30a). Conversely, in any class where (32) is invalid, no filtering is expected to
occur. Such invalidation of the implication (32) happens if the context explicitly
negates it, as in the following example:
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(33) The hot water supply in Bill’s place relies on gas heating, so that no single
person could possibly take a bath that would exhaust the hot water. At present
there’s some problem with Bill’s heating system. Not knowing that, Bill
suggests Jane, who is staying at his place, to take a bath whenever she pleases.
If Jane takes a bath, Bill will be annoyed (to hear from her) that there is no
more hot water.
Here, where sentence (30a) is used in a context that explicitly denies (32), we easily
infer from it that there is no more hot water. Thus, as soon as the assumption
about the causal relation in (32) is dropped there is no filtering, and sentence (30a)
shows a stronger presupposition than the conditional presupposition that Algorithm
1 uniformly derives for it. This is another instance of the proviso problem. By
contrast, Algorithm 2 with the revised filtering condition (31) does not suffer from
this problem, in the same way that it avoids the proviso problem in (30b).
4.2 Presupposition suspension
As we saw, presuppositions usually get projected from non-veridical environments.
However, it is well-known that this kind of projection may be “cancelled” or “sus-
pended” under certain pragmatic conditions, independently of the filtering mecha-
nism discussed so far in this paper. Consider for instance the following example:
(34) There is no king of France. Therefore, the king of France is not hiding in this
room. (von Fintel 2008)
In out-of-the-blue contexts, negative sentences like the king of France is not hiding
in this room project the presupposition about a French king (cf. (4)). However, in
the context of (34), which explicitly denies this presupposition, it does not appear.
It is natural to hypothesize that the potential contradiction is the cause for the fact
that (34) does not project the existence presupposition of the king of France (Gazdar
1979; Soames 1982). A common approach to such cases since Heim (1983) has
been to assume that with many of the presupposition triggers (the “soft” triggers
of Abusch 2002), presupposition projection leads to a systematic ambiguity. For
instance, the sentence the king of France is not hiding in this room in (34) is assumed
to be ambiguous between:
A. A default reading, obtained using the normal projection strategies. This reading
presupposes that there is a (unique) king of France, and asserts that that person
is not hiding in this room.
B. A secondary reading, obtained using a special procedure of presupposition
suspension. This reading does not presuppose anything, and simply asserts that
there is no king of France who is hiding in this room.
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When the secondary reading is attested, we describe it by saying that the presuppo-
sition of the default reading is suspended, or “locally accommodated”.
In trivalent semantics it is easy to derive presupposition suspension is by applying
Bochvar’s assertion operator to the default reading (Beaver & Krahmer 2001). This
is the operator that maps 0 to 0, 1 to 1 and ∗ to 0, thus making any trivalent
proposition bivalent, where ‘∗’ is mapped to falsity. Applying Bochvar’s operator in
the scope of negation suppresses the presupposition in (34). This move is technically
unproblematic.11 By contrast, a detailed linguistic analysis of the circumstances
that license presupposition suspension is quite challenging.12 For our purposes here
it is sufficient to note that pragmatic pressures as in (34) may cause suspension of
presuppositions that otherwise get projected as a matter of course.
4.3 Back to conditional presuppositions
With this background, let us get back now to sentence (28) and to its purported
conditional presupposition (29):
(35) a. If Buganda is a monarchy, then Buganda’s king will be at the meeting.
(=(28))
b. If Buganda is a monarchy, then Buganda has a king. (=(29))
Sentence (35b) is surely a likely conclusion from (35a). The critical theoretical
question concerns the status of this conclusion. Should (35b) be analyzed as a
presupposition of (35a) that is derived by the core projection mechanism, or are
there other reasons to infer (35b) from (35a)?13 According to Karttunen’s line,
this question can only be settled once we know which facts a speaker or hearer
believes in. In terms of the filtering condition (31), we need to determine the class
of intended modelsM . Relative to classes of models where the conditional (35b)
holds, condition (31) expects (35a) to show filtering, thus not to presuppose that
11 Formally, let ϕ =there is a (unique) king of France and ψ =there is a king of France who is hiding
in this room. Let χ be the trivalent proposition that equals ∗ if ϕ is false and equals ¬ψ otherwise.
The default reading of the king of France is not hiding is ¬χ , whereas the secondary reading is
¬B(χ), where B is Bochvar’s operator. This secondary reading amounts to the bivalent proposition
(¬ϕ)∨ (¬ψ), which accounts for the reasoning in (34).
12 Previous work in Abusch (2002); Abbott (2006); Abrusán (2016), among others, considers many
complex examples of suspension, e.g.:
(i) If you stopped smoking in 2001, you are eligible for a payment from Tobacco Indemnity
Fund. (Abusch 2002, adapted from Kadmon 2001)
Sentence (i) suspends the presupposition that the addressee used to smoke prior to 2001. The reasons
for this suspension are harder to analyze than in (34).
13 Mandelkern & Rothschild (2018: 3) quote an unpublished note by Heim (2006), who asks whether a
hearer of (35a) accommodates (35b) when (35a) is presented out-of-the-blue.
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Buganda has a king. However, if within some classM0 there are models where
Buganda is a monarchy without a king, then no filtering is expected to occur in (35a)
relative to M0. Such classes of models describe contexts where the conditional
(35b) is not taken for granted. With such classes, Algorithm 2 derives for (35a)
the presupposition that Buganda has a king. This should make (35a) pragmatically
infelicitous, since the antecedent Buganda is a monarchy is satisfied. Accordingly, in
a context where (35b) is not assumed, a hearer may consider (35a) to be incoherent.
This incoherence may lead the hearer in one of two directions. First, even if the
hearer does not know (35b) for a fact, the likelihood of this statement may lead her to
contemplate the possibility that the speaker assumes (35b). According to the filtering
condition (31), that would make the presupposition about Buganda’s king disappear.
In such a case, upon hearing (35a), the hearer may infer (or “accommodate”) (35b)
not because this sentence is technically presupposed by (35a), but because it is a
priori plausible, and accepting it saves (35a) from infelicity. Alternatively, the hearer
may suspend the presupposition that Buganda has a king altogether. This would
result in the following reading of (35a), without any presupposition:
(36) If Buganda is a monarchy, then Buganda has a (unique) king and Buganda’s
king will be at the meeting.
Either strategy avoids the undesirable projection of the proposition that Buganda has
a king, while leading to the conclusion in (35b). The possibility of such interpretative
strategies weakens the argument that (35b) must be hard-wired as a presupposition
of (35a).
The discussion above rests on two inferences that example (35a) involves, inde-
pendently of the question of conditional presuppositions:
(i) The entailment that any country with a king is a monarchy;
(ii) The weak implication suggesting that a stereotypical monarchy (in Africa?) may
have a king as a matter of course.
As we saw, both factors leave the possibility open that we do not need to derive
a conditional presupposition in order to account for the interpretation of (35a).
Looking at more examples can help us to tease factors (i) and (ii) apart. To do that,
let us first consider sentence (37) below (from Geurts 1996), and its variation in
(38):
(37) If Theo is a scuba diver, then he will bring his wet suit.
(38) If Theo is blind, then he will bring his guide dog.
From sentence (38) it is hard to infer that Theo has a guide dog, but it is natural
to infer from it that Theo has a guide dog if he is blind. Similarly to the weak
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implication (ii) in (35a), also in (38) it is easy to perceive a causal connection
between the blindness of a person and his owning a guide dog. Unlike (35a), the
implication that someone who has a guide dog should be blind is not an entailment
like (i) but an inference based on world knowledge. However, this inference is so
prominent in our world knowledge that the analysis of (38) can remain quite close
to that of (35a). The situation in sentence (37) is somewhat trickier. According to
Geurts (1996: 272), we can draw from sentence (37) the conclusion that Theo has a
wet suit, but it is more likely to draw from it the weaker conclusion that Theo has a
wet suit if he is a scuba diver. The logical situation is similar to Beaver’s example
(30a): there may be an a priori assumption that if Theo is scuba diver he has a wet
suit. Unlike (35a) and (38), the implication does not go in the other direction, from
wet suits to scuba divers (surfers and other water sportspersons also wear wet suits).
Thus, no pragmatic deviance would emerge in (37) from the presupposition that Theo
has a wet suit. This may be the reason for the possibility that this presupposition
may optionally be projected.
A different situation is observed in the following example from (Heim 1983):
(39) #If John has children, then Mary will not like his twins.
There is no natural candidate for a presupposition in (39), as the sentence is infelici-
tous. To analyze (39), it is relevant that there is an entailment from having twins to
having children, similar to the entailment (ii) in sentence (35a). However, (39) is
different from (35a) in that there is no common sense implication (not even a weak
one) that someone who has children should have twins. Heim (1983) attributes the
oddity of (39) to the oddity of that implication, which according to her proposal
should be a conditional presupposition of (39). However, the oddity of sentence
(39) might also stem from the projection of the presupposition John has twins,
which should render the sentence pragmatically deviant. I think that this analysis in
terms of pragmatic deviance is advantageous to Heim’s account, which relies on a
contradiction between her postulated conditional presupposition and common world
knowledge. However, pace Heim, even in out-of-the-blue contexts, there is nothing
inherently wrong in presupposing unlikely conditionals. For instance (cf. Geurts
1996: 284):
(40) Jane knows/has discovered that if John has children then he must have twins.
The presupposition that we infer (or “accommodate”) from (40) is perhaps scientifi-
cally dubious, but it does not lead to the same infelicity as in (39). This gives reason
to doubt Heim’s claim that the infelicity of (39) should result from its purported
conditional presupposition, rather than from a simple presupposition that entails the
antecedent, as straightforward projection would expect.
The following example is a variation on Heim’s example:
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(41) #If John has a child, then Mary will not like his son.
This example is minimally different from (35a). In both cases we have a conditional
whose consequent triggers a gender presupposition (“king”/“son”) on top of the
information in the antecedent (“monarch”/“child”). According to the present account,
the difference in the felicity of (35a) and (41) is related to the a priori likelihood of
the implication from monarch to king, as opposed to implausibility of the implication
from child to son. For relevant discussion see further in (Lassiter 2012).
The last two logical possibilities that may be considered in this respect involve
examples like the following:
(42) If Theo is smart, then he will bring his wet suit.
(43) If Theo has a wet suit, then Sue will know that he is a scuba diver.
Sentence (42) presupposes that Theo has a wet suit, as Algorithm 2 expects. This
is another case where there is no a priori implication from the antecedent to the
presupposition of the consequent. In addition, in (42) there is no inferential relation
in the opposite direction either. In (43), the prominent presupposition is that Theo
is a scuba diver. A weak assumption that scuba divers have wet suits is likely to
be defeated in this case by that presupposition. Conversely, assuming that scuba
divers have wet suits might defeat the presupposition by rendering the conditional
pragmatically odd. This situation might lead to suspension, with the following
secondary reading of (43):
(44) If Theo has a wet suit, then he is a scuba diver and Sue will know that he is a
scuba diver.
Table 2 summarizes the implicational variety that we can observe in the examples
above, some of whose have conditional inferences that have been classified as
conditional presuppositions. We see that the critical factor for the emergence of such
inferences is the assumption in (i): whether there is an a priori weak implication
from the antecedent ϕ to the presupposition ψ ′ of the consequent. When such an
implication is plausible in out-of-the-blue contexts, the presupposition is filtered, as
Karttunen proposed. Similarly to Karttunen’s analysis, the current account does not
see implications that are part of common knowledge as conditional presuppositions
that are derived by the projection mechanism. Indeed, as we saw, in the cases where
such a relevant weak implication is a priori unlikely, the presupposition is fully
projected.
In the examples of Table 2, an implication or entailment (ii) from ψ ′ to ϕ
may be a factor that primes the weak implication (i). However, on its own an
inferential relation as in (ii) does not immediately lead to suspension, at least not
with presuppositions that are triggered by possessive descriptions. For instance, in
Heim’s example (39) we do not have a reading like (45):
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ψ ′ projected? assumptions
(i) (ii)
(35a) if [B is a monarchy]ϕ then [B’s king will arrive]ψ no ϕ99Kψ ′ ψ ′⇒ϕ
ψ ′ = B has a king
(38) if [T is blind]ϕ then [he’ll bring his guide dog]ψ no ϕ99Kψ ′ ψ ′99Kϕ
ψ ′ = T has a wet suit
(30a) if [J takes bath]ϕ then [B annoyed no hot water]ψ no ϕ99Kψ ′ ψ ′ 699Kϕ
ψ ′ = no hot water
(37) if [T is a scuba diver]ϕ then [he’ll bring his wet suit]ψ
ψ ′ = T has a wet suit
(39) #if [J has children]ϕ then [M won’t like his twins]ψ − ϕ 699Kψ ′ ψ ′⇒ϕ
ψ ′ = J has twins
(43) if [T brings wet suit]ϕ then [S knows T is scuba diver]ψ yes ϕ 699Kψ ′ ψ ′99Kϕ
ψ ′ = T is scuba diver
(42) if [T is smart]ϕ then [he’ll bring his wet suit]ψ yes ϕ 699Kψ ′ ψ ′ 699Kϕ
ψ ′ = T has a wet suit
Table 2 Sentences with/without entailments (‘⇒’) and weak implications
(‘99K’) from the antecedent to the presupposition of the consequent
(i), and in the opposite direction (ii)
(45) If John has children, then he has twins and Mary will not like his twins.
This way of analyzing (39) would lead to an acceptable (though again, scientifically
dubious) interpretation that the sentence does not easily show. Another way to
illustrate that suspension does not play a role in such examples is to consider
examples like the following (cf. Beaver 2001: 122-3):
(46) If Buganda is a monarchy and Buganda’s king is at the meeting, then our
president will be honored.
Sentence (46) easily leads to the conclusion that if Buganda is a monarchy it must
have a king. This conditional inference is analyzed as a presupposition by Algorithm
1 and similar theories, in a reminiscent way to their analysis of (35a). When
Algorithm 2 is used for analyzing sentences like (46), the conditional inference can
be analyzed as resulting from a weak contextual implication, but not in terms of
suspension. The reason is that suppression would lead to the following reading of
(46), which does not support any conditional inference about the gender of Buganda’s
monarch:
(47) If Buganda is a monarchy and has a king, and Buganda’s king is at the
meeting, then our president will be honored.
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This does not mean that presupposition suppression never plays a role when
analyzing conditional inferences from presuppositional sentences. Consider for
instance the following examples:
(48) If John went out, then he regretted that he didn’t take his coat.
(49) a. If John went out and regretted that the didn’t take his coat, then he stopped
somewhere to have a cup of tea.
b. Possibly, John went out and regretted that the didn’t take his coat.
In (48) a prominent inference is that John did not take his coat if he went out. By
contrast, in (49a-b) it is not clear that there is any inference like that. More likely,
these sentences entertain the possibility that John went out, did not take his coat, and
regretted it. This gives reason to believe that suppression plays a role in both (48)
and (49), rather than conditional presuppositions.
To sum up, there is little doubt that sentences with presuppositions may lead
to conditional inferences and to filtering patterns that are not directly expected by
Karttunen’s generalizations in (F1) and (F2). However, such effects do not give
decisive support for hypotheses about conditional presuppositions. The claims
that have been made so far about conditional presuppositions do not make it clear
that we must bite the bullet of tackling the proviso problem that is invoked by
proposals that generate such presuppositions. The clearest cases of conditional
inferences, like Mandelkern and Rothschild’s example (28), can also be explained
using independently motivated principles or other relevant factors. Therefore, given
the available evidence, Algorithm 2, which relies on the filtering condition in (31),
seems like a safer bet than Algorithm 1, which does not rely on any independent
filtering principle.
This is not to say that Algorithm 2 is without problems. So far, all the potential
difficulties that have been discussed here regarding Algorithm 2 concern familiar
claims about conditional presuppositions. The theoretical approaches that these
claims come to support rely on a strategy that we may call partial projection: part of
a presupposition can be projected while the rest is filtered. While the justification for
this strategy is controversial, it is definitely correct that when it comes to sentences
with multiple presupposition triggers, projection is not a matter of all or nothing.
When two or more triggers are involved, a presupposition of one trigger may be
projected while a presupposition of another trigger is filtered (Zuber 1975; van der
Sandt 1988). For instance, let us consider the following sentences:
(50) If [Mary is in a relationship]ϕ , then [she will bring her partner to her brother’s
birthday]ψ .
(51) Possibly, [Mary is in a relationship]ϕ and [will bring her partner to her
brother’s birthday]ψ .
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Sentences (50) and (51) clearly presuppose that Mary has a brother. However, it
is just as clear that they do not presuppose that Mary has a partner. We may call
this phenomenon selective projection. This behavior is not predicted by condition
(31): among the situations that make the operand ψ in these sentences fail there are
situations where Mary doesn’t have a brother but has a partner. In such situations, the
operand ϕ is true, which does not determine the value of the implication/conjunction.
Thus, condition (31) does not expect any filtering in (50) and (51), in disagreement
with the facts. This kind of selective filtering is not directly described by Karttunen’s
original conditions (F1) and (F2).14 Sentences (50) and (51) illustrate that the
projection of presuppositions from different triggers should be handled independently
of each other. The question of how to incorporate this intuition into a proviso-free
trivalent semantics is beyond the scope of this paper.15
5 Conclusions
Presuppositions are often thought of as a pragmatic matter, and there are many good
reasons for that. However, the projection of presuppositions is connected to questions
that are at the heart of formal semantic theory. We cannot separate inference with
presuppositions from the meaning of the most prototypically “logical” elements of
language – the propositional connectives. Against this familiar background, this
paper tried to make a relatively modest point: the Strong Kleene intuition about
the logical connectives is useful even if the proviso problem makes it impossible
to embrace the Strong Kleene tables as the semantics of the natural connectives.
The determinant values in the classic bivalent truth tables can predict presupposition
projection even when the Strong Kleene tables are abandoned. Using determinant
values, Karttunen’s original conditions can be synthesized with the incremental
view on the Strong Kleene semantics, so that the proviso problem does not emerge.
The many examples that have been argued to support the derivation of conditional
presuppositions do not give sufficient reason to eschew this synthesis.
14 The filtering conditions (F1) and (F2) do not specify which presuppositions of the second operand S2
they apply to. For instance, the consequent S2 of (28) presupposes that Buganda has a king, which
entails Buganda is a monarchy. It seems that Karttunen (1973) would not like to classify Buganda is
a monarchy as a presupposition of the consequent in (28). As van der Sandt (1988: 46-7) claims,
such a view does not conform with a semantic definition like (6).
15 Algorithm 1 does not offer an immediate remedy. Indeed, in (50) this algorithm does not project the
presupposition that Mary has a partner, but at the usual price of the proviso problem: Algorithm 1
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